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RISK OF LOSS, IN EQUITY, BETWEEN THE DATE OF
CONTRACT TO SELL REAL ESTATE AND
TRANSFER OF TITLE
By HARRY W.

VANNEMAN*

I should buy a house, and before the time as by the articles I
am to pay for the same, the house be burnt down by casualty
of fire, I shall not be bound to pay for the house." This dictum
of Sir Joseph Jekyll, M.R., in the case of Stent v. Baylis' correctly stated the early English rule in so far as the rule was
settled, but from the days of Lord Eldon to the present the rule
in England has been contra and the decisions in the American
courts have been in conflict.
The above quotation presents the simplest possible group of
operative facts: a binding contract by which the vendor agrees
to sell a property on which there is standing a building; the title
papers to be executed at a fixed future date, at which time the
purchaser is to pay a certain price; before the date for passing
the title papers the building is destroyed by accidental fire.
Neither party is at fault. All courts agree that the loss should
fall upon the owner. The difference of opinion arises in determining which party is the owner in equity.
At law the loss would fall upon the vendor. 2 He can neither
recover the unpaid purchase price from the purchaser nor retain
any payments which he may have received. The legal title, together with all the incidents of ownership, is in him. He cannot
perform his contract, because of partial failure of the consideration. The purchaser's only redress is an action for breach of
contract. The result is that the obligation is non-enforceable at
law and the loss remains with the vendor.
In equity, however, by the weight of authority, if the dicta of
courts be considered as well as actual decisions, the risk of loss
is shifted to the purchaser from the moment a binding contract
is made which equity will specifically enforce. This view has
it

IF

*Professor of Law, University of South Dakota,, Vermillion, S. D.
1(1724) 2 P. Wms. 217, 220.
2
Wells v. Calnan, (1871) 107 Mass. 514.
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had the support of many text writers. 3 Sometimes a decision is
based on the maxim, "equity regards as done what is agreed to
be done ;" sometimes on the trust doctrine that from the moment
of the contract the vendor is trustee for the purchaser; oftentimes resort is made to the mortgage theory that from the date
of contract the vendor retains title as security for the purchase
money; sometimes the equitable conversion doctrine is advanced;
and not infrequently a court uses more than one theory in the
same case. Practically all courts accepting this view treat the
purchaser as "equitable owner," using the theory which best suits
the fancy of the particular court.
In the leading case of Paine v. Meller Lord Eldon, in describing the purchaser's position in a court of equity, said, the
premises "are his to all intents and purposes. They are vendible
as his, chargeable as his; capable of being encumbered as his;
they may be devised as his; they may be assets; and they would
descend to his heir." While it may be true that that case did not
decide precisely the question here being considered,' there can be
no doubt that the later English courts,' and many American
courts 7 rely upon this case as settling the rule. Paine v. Meller
35 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisdiction, sec. 2282; Fry, Specific Performance,
sec. 911; Sugden, Vendors and Purchasers, 8th ed. 446; Eaton, Equity,
sec. 21.
4(1801)
6 Ves. Jr. 349.
5
1t has been pointed out that the practice in England requires the
purchaser to prepare the title papers which are then presented to the
vendor for execution, and that in Paine v. Meller the purchaser was in
default and, therefore, the loss should not be placed on the vendor. Dean
Langdell in 1 Harv. L. Rev. 375, note 1. This view is urged in 6 MINNESOTA
LAW REvIEw 513; Good v. Jarrard, (1912) 93 S.C. 229, 76 S.E. 698, 43
L.R.A. (N.S.) 383, and with strong dissenting opinion in McGinley v.
Forrest, (1921) 107 Neb. 309, 186 N.W. 74, 22 A.L.R. 567. Prof. Williston
does not think, however, that the purchaser was in default as he had two
days 6left in which to prepare the papers. 9 Harv. L. Rev. 112, note 1.
Poole v. Adams, (1864) 10 L.T. 287, 12 W. R. 683, 33 L.J. Ch. 639;
Ex parte Minor, (1805) 11 Ves. Jr. 559. See other cases cited in 1 Ames,
Cases7 on Equity 228, note 2.
1n the following cases the purchaser was in possession and the loss
was thrown upon him: Loventhal v. Home Ins. Co., (1895) 112 Ala. 108,
20 So. 419, 57 A.S.R. 17, 33 L.R.A. 258; Roach v. Richardson, (1907) 84
Ark. 37, 104 S.W. 538 (court does not stress the point of possession);
Strachem v. Drake, (1916) 61 Colo. 444, 158 Pac. 310 (same comment);
Mackey v. Bowles, (1896) 98 Ga. 730, 25 S.E. 834, (dictum, possession in
vendee strongly emphasized); Davidson v. Hawkeye Ins. Co., (1887) 71
Ia. 532, 60 A.S.R. 818, 32 N.W. 514 (case has been cited in this and next
group); Hueston v. Miss. & Rum River Boom Co., (1899) 76 Minn. 251,
79 N.W. 92, (dictum, vendee called equitable owner and allowed to maintain trespass) ; see also Chemedlin v. Prince, (1870) 15 Minn. 331; Linn
Co. Bank v. Grisham, (1919) 105 Kan. 460, 185 Pac. 54; Walker v. Owen,
(1883) 79 Mo. 563; Marion v. Walcott, (1904) 68 N.J.Eq. 20, 59 Atl. 242;
Sutton v. Davis, (1906) 143 N.C. 474, 55 S.E. 844; Robb v. Mann, (1849)
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and Sugden on Vendors and Purchasers, who derives his rule
therefrom, are most often cited as authority for the English or
majority view.
The court of equity has departed from the law rule largely
in the development of its extraordinary remedy of specific per11 Pa. St. 300 (possession not stressed); Morgan v. Scott, (1856) 26 Pa.
St. 51; Reed v. Lukens, (1863) 44 Pa. St. 200, 84 Am. Dec. 425 (possession
not shown and point not stressed) ; Millville Ins. Co. v. Wilgus, (1878) 88
Pa. St. 107; Imperial Ins. Co. v. Dunham, (1888) 117 Pa. St. 470, 12 Atl.
668; Elliott v. Ashland Mut. Ins. Co., (1888) 117 Pa. St. 548, 2 A.S.R. 703,
12 Atl. 676; Miller v. Zufall, (1886) 113 Pa. St. 317, 6 Ati. 350; Brakage v.
Tracy, (1900) 13 S.D. 343, 83 N.W. 363; Russell v. Elliott, (1922) 45 S.D.
184, 22 A.L.R. 557, 186 N.W. 823; Baker v. Rushford, (1917) 91 Vt. 495,
101 Atl. 769 (possession not stressed) ; Virginia Ry. Co. v. Jeffries, (1909)
110 Va. 471, 66 S.E. 731; Wetzler v. Duffy, (1890) 78 Wis. 170, 12 L.R.A.
178, 47 N.W. 184 (qtiestion left open); Columbian Ins. Co. v. Lawrence,
(1829) 2 Pet. (U.S.) 25, 7 L. Ed. 335.
In many of these cases the fact that possession was in the vendee is
treated as immaterial. It is not contended that the decision would have been
otherwise if possession had been in the vendor, but the cases as they stand
are not authority for the broad rule of the next group although the courts
by dictum often indicate that they would so decide -egardless of possession.
The following cases place the loss upon the vendee even though the
vendor is in possession: Phinizy v. Guernsey, (1900) 111 Ga. 346, 50 L.R.A.
680, 78 A.S.R. 217, 36 S.E. 796 (dictum, the vendor's title was defective);
Thompson v. Norton, (1860) 14 Ind. 187; O'Brien v. Paulsen, (1922) 192
Ia. 1351, 186 N.W. 440 (the court very clearly states that possession in
vendee is immaterial and clears up any doubt created by Davidson v.
Hawkeye Ins. Co., (1887) 71 Ia. 532, 32 N.W. 514, 60 A.S.R. 818) ; Gammon
v. Blaisdell, (1891) 45 Kan. 221, 25 Pac. 580 (the entire tract was taken by
eminent domain while the vendor was still in possession and yet the vendee
was required to pay for same; he was allowed condemnation value);
Johnson v. Jones, (1851) 12 B. Mon. (Ky.) 326 (joint possession) ; Martin
v. Carver, (1886) 8 Ky. L. Rep. 56, 1 S.W. 199; Calhoun v. Belden, 3
Bush (Ky.) 674; but see Marks v. Techenor, (1887) 85 Ky. 536, 4 S.W.
225; Brewer v. Herbert, (1869) 30 Md. 301, 96 Am. Dec. 583; Skinner and
Sons Co. v. Houston, (1900) 92 Md. 68, 48 Atl. 85; Hamilton v. Insurance
Co., (1894) 98 Mich. 535, 57 N.W. 735 (dictum); Manning v. No. British
Ins. Co., (1907) 123 Mo. App. 456, 99 S.W. 1095 (dictum that possession
was not necessary to throw the loss upon the vendee, and explains away
what was said about possession in Walker v. Owen, (1883) 79 Mo. 563) ;
Snyder v. Murdock, (1872) 51 Mo. 175. See also Mahan v. Ins. Co., (1920)
205 Mo. App. 592, 226 S.W. 593; Rauck v. Wickwire, (1913) 255 Mo. 42,
104 S.W. 460; Blew v. McClelland, (1860) 29 Mo. 304; McGinley v. Forrest, (1921) 107 Neb. 309, 186 N.W. 74, 22 A.L.R. 567. See comment in
77 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 248; Cropper v. Brown, (1909) 76 N.J. Eq. 406, 139
A.S.R. 770, 74 At!. 987 (dictum that possession is immaterial) ; Woodward
v. McCullum, (1907) 16 N.D. 42, 111 N.W. 623; Dunn v. Yakish, (1900)
10 Okl. 388, 61 Pac. 926; No. Texas Realty and Construction Co. v. Lary,
(Tex. 1911) 136 S.W. 843 (party in possession did not appear); Maudru
v. Humphreys, (1919) 83 W.Va. 307, 98 S.E. 259; Paine v. Meller, (1801)
6 Ves. Jr. 347; Poole v. Adams, (1864) 33 L.J. Ch. 639, 10 L.T. 287, 12
W.R. 683. See also the annuity cases, White v. Nutt, (1702) 1 P. Wms.
61; Kenny v. Wexham, (1822) 6 Madd. 355.
The rule in New York is by no means free from doubt, although the
tendency is probably toward the majority view, which considers possession
an unessential incident. In the recent case of Sewell v. Underhill, (1910)
197 N.Y. 168, 90 N.E. 430, 27 L.R.A. (N.S.) 233, 134 A.S.R. 863, 18 Ann.
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formance. The contract stated above falls in the class of contracts which equity will specifically enforce. The query is at
Cas. 795, Mr. Justice Gray said: "I am unable to find that the authority
of the English rule has been shaken in this state, that a loss by fire, or other
accident, not due to the fault of the vendor, must fall on the vendee, when
the title is satisfactory and the contract is, therefore, capable of being
specifically performed by the vendor."
There are two earlier cases which seem to make the risk of loss depend
upon possession, and ability on the part of the vendor to deliver what he
had agreed to sell. In Smith v. McCluskey, (1866) 45 Barb. (N.Y.) 610,
the court said: "In this case the vendor had not parted with title or possession at the time of the disaster, which disaster rendered it impossible
for him to deliver the substance of what was agreed to be transferred."
See also, Wicks v. Bowman, (1874) 5 Daly (N.Y.) 225. It should be
noted, however, that in this case the contract was for the sale of a "lot
of land, with all the buildings and improvements thereon." Dean Pound
says these are overruled cases. 33 Harv. L. Rev. 826.
Another early case went to the opposite extreme and ruled that the
vendee must suffer the loss even though the vendor retained possession.
Gates v. Smith, (1846) 4 Edws. Ch. (N.Y.) 702. This view seems to be
followed in the recent case of Neponsit Realty Co. v. Judge, (1919) 106
Misc. 445, 176 N.Y.S. 135. The property in this case was probably vacant
land. In Goldman v. Rosenberg, (1889) 116 N.Y. 78, 22 N.E. 259, the
vendor, a partnership, was in possession and was held bound to suffer the
loss. The case was distinguished in Sewell v. Underhill, (1910) 197 N.Y.
168, 90 N.E. 430, 27 L.R.A. (N.S.) 233, 134 A.S.R. 863, 18 Ann. Cas. 795,
on its peculiar facts. It seems the partnership was privileged to sell
back to the vendor, one of the partners, the property which he had contributed to the partnership venture, but the contract did not bind it to do so.
It was optional, hence it seems very proper in such a case to let the loss
lie where it falls, on the partnership. It is doubtful if the purchaser in the
agreement to sell back could enforce specific performance. The court by
dictum seemed to approve of the English rule in Paine v. Meller, (1801)
6 Ves. Jr. 349.
A vendee in possession was considered the owner to the extent that he
could insure the buildings in Aetna Fire Ins. Co. v. Tyler, (1835) 16 Wend.
(N.Y.) 396, 30 Am. Dec. 90, and to maintain an action of trespass in Rood
v. New York, etc., Ry. Co., (1854) 18 Barb. (N.Y.) 80.
The Sewell Case, above, is the last utterance by the court of appeals
and is generally considered as adopting the English view; see 8 Mich. L.
Rev. 515, 23 Harv. L. Rev. 476. The court relies upon Gates v. Smith,
(1846) 4 Edw. Ch. (N.Y.) 702; Goldman v. Rosenberg, (1889) 116 N.Y.
78, 22 N.E. 259; McKenzie v. Sterling, (1867) 48 Barb. (N.Y.) 330 and
other cases. See also Mott v. Coddirtgton, (1863) 1 Abb. Pr. N.S. (N.Y.)
290. The rule is followed with some reluctance in Cammarata v. Merkewitz,
(1923) 120 Misc. 503, 198 N.Y.S. 825, where Mr. Justice Rodenbeck said:
"The fact that the plaintiffs were not in possession when the fire occurred
creates no distinction, as the rule, in the absence of special agreement turns
upon the title and rights of the parties at the time that the agreement of
sale is made, and not, as in the case of personal property, upon the question
of delivery. There are cases in which the loss is made to depend upon
possession," citing Wicks v. Bowman, (1874) 5 Daly (N.Y.) 225, "or the
right to immediate possession under the contract," citing McKenzie v.
Sterling, (1867) 48 Barb. (N.Y.) 330, "or upon the destruction of personal
property in conjunction with the real property," Listman v. Hickey, (1892)
65 Hun (N.Y.) 8, 19 N.Y.S. 880, affirmed 143 N.Y. 630, 37 N.E. 827, to
which may be added Clinton v. Hope Ins. Co., (1871) 45 N.Y. 454, "but
the great weight of authority is that in the absence of special agreement,
the equitable interest that is created by an agreement to sell casts the loss
upon the vendee," citing Sewell v. Underhill, (1910) 197 N.Y. 168, 90 N.E.
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once suggested, should this difference in remedy makce a difference in result? The answer requires an analysis of the
vendor-purchaser relationship, which must be considered from
two points of view: that of property or "ownership" and that of
contract.
The view point of "ownership" has been championed by
Professor Keener 8 who strongly supports the majority view held
by Lord Eldon. He urges that equity should proceed with this
problem just as it has with other problems where specific per430, 27 L.R.A. (N.S.) 233, 134 A.S.R. 863, 18 Ann. Cas. 795. "The court
is bound to follow this ruling, even if it does not appeal to one's sense of
justice, that a person out of possession or without the right of possession
with no control over the care of the property, should be obliged to pay
for something the vendor is unable to deliver."
Mr. Justice Kapper, in the case of Boehm v. Platt, (1921) 115 Misc.
55, 189 N.Y.S. 16, refused to be bound by the view which did not appeal to
his sense of justice and very clearly made possession the controlling factor.
His view was rejected, however, in Pellegrino v. Giuliani, (1922) 118 Misc.
329, 193 N.Y.S. 258.
With this disagreement in the supreme courts of New York it is likely
the question will not be set at rest until court of appeals again has the
matter before it.
Judicial sales.-The same conflicting views obtain where the sale is by
order of court, and time is allowed between the date of bidding and the
judicial confirmation of the sale, during which time better bids may be
received. If the property is partially destroyed during this interim, on
whom should the loss fall?
Some of the courts which place the loss on the purchaser where the
contract is complete treat the inchoate purchaser in such a case as a mere
"preferred bidder," and the transaction as not a contract. Hence, the
vendor-purchaser relation never having been perfected, the loss remains
with the vendor. In re Sermon's Land, (1921) 182 N.C. 122, 108 S.E. 495,
approved in 20 Mich. L. Rev. 554; Upchurch v. Upchurch, (1917) 173 N.C.
88, 91 S.E. 702; Harral v. Blythe, (1906) 140 N.C. 415, 53 S.E. 232;
Ex parte Minor, (1805) 11 Ves. Jr. 559; Twigg v. Fifield, (1807) 13 Ves.
Jr. 517; Robb v. Mann, (1849) 11 Pa. St. 300; Demmy's Appeal, (1862)
43 Pa. St. 155. The bid is merely a proposal to buy. On the other hand,
it has been held that the confirmation of the sale is a mere ministerial act
which relates back to the date of the sale and that the loss falls upon the
purchaser from that date. Crooper v. Brown, (1909) 76 N.J.Eq. 406, 74
At. 987. In New Jersey the rule seems to be largely the result of statute
which the court thinks had taken away the contingent nature of bids at
judicial sales. It seems the bid stands there as final unless equitable
grounds require an opening of the bid. The policy of the state is, apparently, to make judicial sales identical, in this respect, to private sales.
81 Col. L. Rev. 1. For the rules stated by Prof. Keener the following
cases are cited as authorities: (1) Daniels v. Davison, (1811) 17 Ves. 433;
Lovejoy v. Potter,- (1886) 60 Mich. 95; Moyer v. Hinman, (1855) 13 N.Y.
180. (2) Townsend v. Champenowne, (1827) 9 Price 130; Buck v. Buck,
(1844) 11 Paige (N.Y.) 170. (3) Langford v. Pitt, (1731) 2 P. Wins. 629.
(4) Same as (2). (5) Bailey v. Duncan, (1827) 4 T.B. Mon. (Ky.) 256.
(6) Foster v. Deacon, (1818) 3 Madd, 203; Phillips v. Silvester, (1872)
L. R. 8 Ch. Ap. 173; Clarke v. Ramuz, [1891] 2 Q.B. 456. (7) King v.
Ruckman, (1873) 24 N.J.Eq. 556. (8) Same as (7).
(9) Lysaght v.
Edwards, (1876) L.R. 2 Ch. Div. 499. (10) Oldham v. Sale, (1840)
1 B. Mon. (Ky.) 76. (11) Moyer v. Hinman, (1855) 13 N.Y. 180.
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formance- of this sort of contract is involved and dispose of the
risk of loss by analogy in the same way. The following rules
which equity has evolved are presented as affording a guide to
the proper disposition of the risk of loss. They also suggest his
method of approach, viz., that of property and not contract.
"(1) The vendee can call for a conveyance of the property
from a donee, or purchaser with notice. (2) The interest of the
vendee can be assigned or devised. (3) In the event of the yendee's death, his heir, not his personal representative, is entitled
to a conveyance. (4) Under a devise by the vendee of his real
estate, the interest of the vendee passes. (5) In jurisdictions
where a wife is given dower in equitable estate, the widow of
the vendee is entitled to dower. (6) The vendee has the right to
require husband-like conduct of the vendor in the management
of the estate. (7) The vendee is chargeable with the cost of
improvements made by the vendor under compulsion of law.
(8) The vendee is chargeable with taxes paid by the vendor beyond the value of the usufruct. (9) An estate which a vendor
has contracted to sell will pass under a will to a devisee to whom
the vendor has devised the estates held in trust by him. (10) A
court of equity will not allow a widow to claim, as against the
vendee, dower in land which the husband had, before his marriage, contracted to sell. (11) The property is no longer liable
for the debts of the vendor."
To this list Professor Williston 9 adds, the insurance cases
which hold the vendee is the "owner" under policies with clauses
making the contract void unless the insured reveals the true
state of the title and the multitude of cases in which the vendor
is called trustee.
An examination of several of these rules which evidence
"equitable ownership" will disclose that they would have been
decided the same way had the rights of the purchaser been
simply contractual. For instance, suppose that by the agreement an option to buy land had been secured instead of a contract of sale. Equity does not treat an optionee as "owner" and
certainly the risk of loss is not upon him. 10 Nevertheless, as
has been pointed out by Professor Williston, a purchaser for
value with notice does not take free from the optionee's rights;
nor would a donee. An optionor could not deal with the property in an unhusband-like manner. And it is difficult to see why
the same reasoning used in the case of King v. Ruckinan,11 by
which a vendee was charged with improvements made under
92 Williston, Contracts, sec. 930.
lOIbid, sec. 936 and cases cited in note 70.
"lNote 8.
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compulsion of law, and subjected to taxes beyond the value of
the usufruct, could not be used equally well to place these burdens upon the optionee if he exercised his option. Thus it would
seem that "equitable ownership" was unnecessary in reaching
the first, second, sixth, seventh and eighth rules.
Respecting the rules of inheritance of property subject to a
contract of sale, the rule that the vendee's interest passes by a
general devise of his real estate, the dower interest of the
vendee's widow, and the rule that the vendor's will of trust
estates carries real estate contracted to be -sold, it should be observed that the issue was in no case between the parties to the
contract but at most between one party to the contract and third
party volunteers.
"It may be entirely proper for equity to arrange the rules of
inheritance in accordance with an intention of the1 2 owner to
change the nature of the property at a future time.'
But to do this resort is had to a pure fiction. No principle
of contracts is violated. It does not follow that the same fiction
should be employed to carry the risk of loss to the vendee merely
for the sake of uniformity where the issue is between the parties
themselves, when as often as not, it is contrary to their discoverable intention. The theory of "equitable ownership," which
was proper enough in the third, fourth, fifth, ninth and tenth
rules, where third party volunteers were concerned, becomes of
doubtful value and propriety in fixing the risk of loss inasmuch as it does violence to a contract principle.
Both the "equitable ownership" theory and the equitable conversion theory, the latter being but another method of describing
the same result, are entirely a consequence of specific performance of contracts in equity. -It is apparent, says Dean Stone :13
"That the theory of equitable ownership of land, subject to
a contract of sale, is literally an incident of specific performance,
and cannot exist apart from it. A preliminary to the determination of the question whether there is equitable ownership of land
must therefore necessarily be the determination of the question
whether there is a contract which can be and ought to be specifically performed at the very time when the court is called upon
to perform it."
Courts that place the risk of loss on the purchaser lose sight
of this sequence. Instead of asking whether the contract can
be specifically performed they reverse the order and say that
2
Note 10.
1313 Col. L. Rev. 369-386. See also 6 Cornell L. Rev. 111.
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since the purchaser is the equitable owner he must consequently
perform his contract and the loss will, therefore, be his. The
first issue is, should there be a decree for specific performance
at all?
A further difficulty is involved in the equitable conversion
view. As pointed out by Dean Langdell1 4 equitable conversion is
a fiction designed to carry out a supposed intention of the parties.
It depends upon "the intention of the owner of the property as
shown by the making of the contract. But this, surely, has nothing to do with the question whether the ownership of the land
has passed from the vendor to the vendee." Especially is this
true when the fiction would go contrary to the intention of the
parties, a point to be discussed later.
Since the -basic question is whether the contract can be specifically performed, it may be well to inquire whether, after the
destruction of a part of the res, the vendor has a standing in a
court of equity sufficient to entitle him to specific performance.
It is clear that if a vendor cannot make out a good title he cannot enforce specific performance"5 and it is urged:
"But if a condition is implied in this connection, why is there
not also an implied condition that the subject matter shall be in
existence when the time for performance arrives? A promise
to convey a house and lot is no more fulfilled by conveying a lot
without a house than by conveying nothing at all. In either case
there is a failure of consideration, and if total failure is a total
16
defense, partial failure should be at least a partial defense."'
141 Harv. L. Rev. 378, 380.

15Phinizy v. Guernsey, (1900) 111 Ga. 346, 36 S.E. 796, 50 L.R.A.
680, 78 A.S.R. 217; Epstein v. Kuhn, (1906) 225 Ill. 115, 10 L.R.A. (N.S.)
117, 80 N.E. 80; Lombard v. Chicago Sinai Cong., (1872) 64 Ill. 477; see 2
Ill. L. Rev. 274; Calhoun v. Belden, (1868) 3 Bush (Ky.) 674; Dickinson
v. Wright, (1885) 56 Mich. 42, 22 N.W. 312; Kinney v. Hickox, (1888)
24 Neb. 167; Violet v. Rose, (1894) 39 Neb. 660, 58 N.W. 216; Smith v.
McCluskey, (1866) 45 Barb. (N.Y.) 610; Bechtel v. Dak. Natl. Bank.
(1915) 35 S.D. 191, 151 N.W. 887; Amundson v. Severson, (1919) 41
S.D. 377, 170 N.W. 633. Here the purchaser was in possession and a
large part of the farm was washed away by the Missouri river, yet the loss
was thrown on the vendor. This case has been cited, 33 Harv. L. Rev. 826,
as an illustration of the rule that possession is immaterial in determining
the risk of loss. The facts show that the vendor did not have title and in
no case could have specific performance, and it is submitted that this is
the crux of the decision and not the matter of possession. No one would
suppose that a defective title in a vendor could be overcome by possession
in the purchaser. Christian v. Cabell, (1872) 22 Gratt. (Va.) 82; Corrodus
v. Sharpe, (1855) 20 Beav. 56; 23 Yale L. Jour. 266.
166 MINNESOTA LAW REviEW 513.
If the vendor has conditions to perform, a failure therein will defeat
specific performance and the loss will be his; Natl. Ins. Co. v. Lumber Co.,
(1905) 217 Ill. 115, 75 N.E. 450; Chappel v. McKnight, (1884) 108 Ill.
570; Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Caldwell, (1900) 187 Ill. 73, 58 N.E. 314; Nunn-
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The cases seem to agree that if the contract called for a delivery of the property in good condition, or to deliver "the land
with improvements and the vendor could not do so, the loss
would be his. Professor Williston insists with good reason that
"a promise to convey must always mean a promise to convey in
substantially the same condition as at the time of the contract."'"
Practically all of the cases in which the loss is thrown upon
the purchaser urge as a matter of justice that since the purchaser
is entitled to any benefits which may accrue he should suffer any
loss. This seems unsound as a premise on which to base specific
performance. It does not show a vendor able to perform his
side of the agreement.
"It is fallacious to argue," said Mr. Chief Justice Gary, "that
the loss should be borne by the vendee on the ground that, if the
value of the land enhanced he would receive the benefits thereof, he should sustain the loss when the land decreases in value.
The argument is unsound for the reason that in one case he gets
the specific property for which he bargained, whereas in the other
case he does not, on account of the failure of the vendor to carry
out his contract."' 8
The majority rule courts frequently treat the vendorpurchaser relation as analogous to that of mortgagee-mortgagor.
Since the vendor retains title he does so as security for the unpaid purchase money. The Illinois court says:
"Although the legal title does not pass from the vendor by
the contract of sale, he holds it from the time merely as security
for the payment of the purchase money. The purchaser becomes
the equitable and substantial owner, subject only to the rights
of the vendor to the payment of the purchase money."' 9
To this may be added the conclusion of the Arkansas court:
"It follows, therefore, that the vendee in analogy to the
mortgagor, is the owner of an equity of redemption, and that
his is the real and beneficial
interest subject, of course, to the
' 20
rights of the vendor.
In at least two essential particulars, however, the analogy
of the mortgage breaks down. It is clear that a vendor may
gesser v. Hart, (1904) 122 Ia. 648, 98 N.W. 505; O'Brien v. Paulsen, (1922)
192 Ia. 1351, 186 N.W. 440; Douglas Co. v. Union Pacific Ry. Co., (1870)
5 Kan. 615; Page v. Loeffler, (1920) 146 La. 890, 22 A.L.R. 563, 84 So.
194.
179 Harv. L. Rev. 106-114. 2 Williston, Contracts, sec. 932.
18Good v. Jarrard, (1912) 93 S.C. 229, 76 S.E. 698, 43 L.R.A. (N.S.)
383. See to same effect the dissenting opinion in McGinley v. Forrest,
(1921)9 107 Neb. 309, 186 N.W. 74, 22 A.L.R. 567.
120Stevenson v. Loehr, (1871) 57 Ill. 509.
Roach v. Richardson, (1907) 84 Ark. 37, 104 S.W. 538; Loventhal
v. Home Ins. Co., (1895) 112 Ala. 108, 20 So. 419, 57 A.S.R. 17, 33 L.R.A.
258; Skinner & Sons Co. v. Houston, (1900) 92 Md. 68, 48 At. 85.
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make time of the essence of the contract and he may do so at
any subsequent time by giving reasonable notice, and equity will
generally enforce the same, provided forfeitures are avoided or
other inequitable results. But no court of equity will permit
a mortgagee to cut off the mortgagor's equity of redemption by
such an agreement. 21 Again, and the absence of a provision to
the contrary, the vendor retains, or is entitled to, the possession
of the property, 22 and to the rents and profits therefrom. Professor Keener recognized this weakness in the analogy but did
not consider it fatal. It would seem, however, that these differences greatly undermine the analogy to a mortgage and the
conclusions drawn therefrom.
Another favorite theory of the cases in this group is that of
trust. This is, of course, admittedly the basis of all the above
rules which Professor Keener formulated. A Maryland court,
after an exhaustive review of the cases thus states the trust view:
"From these and other authorities of equal weight, announcing the maxim that equity regards as done that which was agreed
to be done, is deducted as the established doctrine of equity, that
from the time the owner of an estate enters into a binding agreement for its sale he holds the same in trust for the purchaser,
and the latter becomes a trustee of the purchase money for the
vendor, and being thus in equity the owner, the vendee must
bear any loss which may happen, and is entitled to any benefit
which may accrue to the estate in the interim between the agreement and the conveyance."2 3
The English court in Rayner v. Preston24 is more guarded.
After stating the trust rule Cotton, L. J., said:
"In my opinion this cannot be maintained. An unpaid vendor
is a trustee in a qualified sense only, and is so only because he
has made a contract which the court of equity will give effect to
by transferring the property sold to the purchaser."
A trustee is not entitled to profit by his position. Certainly
he cannot take beneficially the rents and profits from the trust
res, and yet that is precisely what a vendor may do. The purchaser cannot require of him an accounting for the rents- and
212 Williston, Contracts,
221n Alabama, contrary

sec. 937 and numerous cases cited there.
to the general rule, the purchaser is entitled
to possession, in the absence of a stipulation, rather than the vendor. Reid
v. Davis, (1842) 4 Ala. 83; Loventhal v. Home Ins. Co., (1895) 112 Ala.
108, 20
So. 419, 57 A.S.R. 17, 33 L.R.A. 258.
-3 Brewer v. Herbert, (1869) 30 Md. 301, 96 Am. Dec. 583. See also
Phinizy v. Guernsey, (1900) 111 Ga. 346, 50 L.R.A. 680, 78 A.S.R. 217, 36
S.E. 796; Willis v. Wozencraft, (1863) 22 Cal. 608; Skinner & Sons Co.
v. Houston, (1900) 92 Md. 68, 48 Atl. 85; Dunn v. Yakish, (1900) 10
Okla. 388, 61 Pac. 926; Robb v. Mann, (1849) 11 Pa. St. 300.
24(1881) L.R. 18 Ch. Div. 1; Howard v. Miller, (1915) A.C. 318.
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profits. It is submitted, therefore, that in very substantial particulars both the mortgage and the trust analogies fail to apply
to this problem. Furthermore, when at all carefully considered,
the courts apply the doctrines only in those cases where equity
will specifically perform the contract. Hence the first cuestion
reappears, should equity specifically enforce the contract? The
property or "ownership" view point, it is submitted, does not
satisfactorily answer the question.
An incidental question which has caused some difficulty
under the majority rule, and which should be briefly considered
before pursuing the main question further, is that of the proper
disposition of the insurance money which is payable under a
policy held by the vendor on the building which is burned. As
before noted both the vendor2" and the purchaser 26 under a contract of sale have insurable interests, the former to protect his
security, the latter as "owner" under insurance law. Where,
however, a vendor has been paid the purchase price in full, or
may recover it from the purchaser, should he also collect 27 the
insurance money, and, if so, will he hold it beneficially or for
the purchasern?
The leading case is Rayner v. Preston28 to which Castellain v.
Preston29 is a sequel. In the former case it was held, with a
strong dissenting opinion, that a vendor who had been paid might
keep the insurance money so far as the purchaser was concerned,
that the insurance contract was purely personal between the vendor and the insurer, that the purchaser was a stranger to the
contract and could take no rights under it, and that it did not
run with the land sold. The latter case held, as between the
vendor and the insurer, that the vendor could not retain the insurance money, he having suffered no loss, having been paid in
full the purchase price, which the company was bound to indemnify, and that through the doctrine of subrogation the money
could be recovered by the insurer.
25Hamilton v. Ins. Co., (1894) 98 Mich. 535 (vendor's interest must be
"intelligently
insured").
28
Dupreau v. Ins. Co., (1889) 76 Mich. 615; Elliott v. Ashland Ins.
Co., (1888) 117 Pa. St. 548; Melville Ins. Co. v. Wilgus, (1878) 88 Pa. St.
107; Imperial Ins. Co. v. Dunham, (1888) 117 Pa. St. 460 (purchaser is
very 27often described in policies as "sole and unconditional owner").

1n Missouri such a verdict cannot collect from the insurance company,
Mahan v. Home Ins. Co., (1920) 205 Mo. App. 592, 226 S.W. 593; Manning
v. No.
123 Mo. App. 456, 99 S.W. 1095.
2 8 British Ins. Co., (1907)
Note 24.
29(1883) L.R. 11 Q.B. Div. 380.
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The result reached by these English cases seems unwise, unjust and inequitable. The inisurance company has assumed a
risk for which a premium was paid, which has not been changed
by the contract to sell the property and which, on application,
they would have transferred to the purchaser. After the loss
has occurred the insurer should not be relieved except for the
strongest reasons. Someone will suffer loss by the destruction
of the building which was insured. It is no hardship or injustice
upon the company to require it to pay the policy.
The vendor should not be allowed, however, to receive the
insurance money for himself. The vendee is bound by his contract to pay the full price for the property purchased if he has
not done so. The vendor would thus receive double recoverythe price for his property and the insurance money. Such a result would be contrary to sound public policy. It would tend
to encourage incendiarism on the part of unscrupulous vendors
and promote carelessness in vendors who retain possession of the
property until sale is completed.
Furthermore, the vendee suffers loss. He gets less than he
pays for from the vendor. When a court of equity is required
to determine to which of two parties a fund should be paid inequitable results should be avoided.'
While a few American courts have followed the doctrine of
Rayner v. Preston0 the weight of authority3' in this county follows the dissenting opinion of James, L. J. In order to avoid
the injustice of the English rule these courts advance the theory
that the vendor, while entitled to collect the insurance money
from the insurance company, holds it as trustee for the purchaser. The money is considered a substitute for the insured
property, and is held by the vendor under precisely the same
duties and obligations as he had held the building. This view
seems much more equitable and it is in harmony with the general
principles controlling the majority view of the main question,
where the vendor is so often treated as trustee for the purchaser.
SOWhite v. Gilman, (1903) 138 Cal. 375, 71 Pac. 436; Marion v. Wolcott,
(1904) 68 N.J.Eq. 20, 59 Atl. 242; Zenor v. Hayes, (1907) 228 Ill. 626,
81 N.E.
1144, 13 L.R.A. (N.S.) 909; 33 Harv. L. Rev. 826.
3
1Skinner & Sons Co. v. Houston, (1900) 92 Md. 68, 48 Atl. 85;
Williams v. Lilley, (1895) 67 Conn. 50, 34 Atl. 765, 37 L.R.A. 150; Phinizy
v. Guernsey,:.(1900) 111 Ga. 346, 50 L.R.A. 680, 78 A.S.R. 217, 36 S.E. 796;
Gilbert v. Port, (1876) 28 Oh. St. 276; Ins. Co. v. Updegraff, (1853)
21 Pa. St. 513; Reed v. Lukens, (1863) 44 Pa. St. 200, 84 Am. Dec. 425;
Mattingly v. Springfield Ins. Co., (1904) 120 Ky. 768, 83 S.W. 577; Brakage
v. Tracy, (1900) 13 S.D. 343, 83 N.W. 363; Russell v. Elliott, (1922) 45
S.D. 184, 186 N. W. 823, 22 A.L.R. 557, approved in 6 MINNEsOTA LAW
REvI w 607.
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It must be quite readily admitted, of course, that, logically,
the vendor's insurance contract is entirely a collateral matter in
which the purchaser has no concern,3 2 that it is the vendor's interest which is insured and not the vendee's, but it should be constantly remembered that this is a practical business matter and
that the business-man's view point should not be entirely disregarded for the sake of pure logic, especially if the logical result is inequitable and can be avoided. One feels sorely discontented with the results of the English view. The majority
of the courts in this country avoid such results by means of a
theory which is quite consistent with the view which places the
risk of loss on the purchaser. It is submitted that the error was
made in the case of Rayner v. Preston in denying the purchaser
a right in the insurance contract, and it is with some satisfaction
that one recalls that the English Parliament has recently changed
the rule of that case 33 and a similar procedure would seem wise
on the part of those American states which still adhere to its
rule.
To return to the main problem, a second method of approach
is that of the contract point of view. Running through the whole
law of contracts is the endeavor on the part of the courts to
ascertain34 and carry out the intention of the parties. "The intention of the parties is a factor in any proper decision. ' 35 It
is true that the parties have not expressly declared their intention
as to who should bear the loss, hence the court must decide for itself what is reasonable in a given case. Certain elements in the
problem will assist in reaching what may be termed a reasonable
intention. At the time of the bargain what did the vendor intend
to sell? What did the purchaser intend to buy? Certainly if the
building was a material portion of the res its value was represented in a considerable fraction of the price. It would seem
reasonable, therefore, to say that the vendor intended to sell and
the purchaser to buy the land with a building upon it. What would
have been their reaction had the risk of loss been called to their
3233 Harv. L. Rev. 826.

33
Statutes 12 and 13 Geo. V., sec. 105.
"Any money becoming payable after the date of any contract for the sale
of property under any policy of assurance in respect to any damage to or
destruction of property included in such contract shall, on completion of
such contract, be held and receivable by the vendor on behalf of the
purchaser and paid by the vendor to the purchaser on completion of the
sale or as soon thereafter as the same shall be received by the vendor."

This becomes effective in 1925.
342 Williston, Contracts 927, and authorities there cited.
35
Ibid.
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attention? This can only be answered by stating that generally
whenever the parties have stipulated respecting the risk of loss
they have placed it upon the vendor. 3' Thus by their contract,
the parties place the risk of loss just contra to the equity rule
which is followed by the weight of authority. Should equity, in
the absence of a tompelling reason, thus disregard common business experience?
It would seem obvious, moreover, that the parties when they
stipulate that the title shall pass to the purchaser in the future
do not intend a present shifting of ownership. Certainly it cannot be "denied that present ownership is a different thing from
future ownership. '3 7 The difference is ignored by the majority
rule, and doubtless, in many cases, just the reverse of the intention of the parties is made to prevail. Perhaps the most striking
instance of this is to be found in the case of Pellegrino v. Giuliani. s In this case the parties stipulated in their contract, that
the risk of 16ss by fire should be upon the vendor but made no
provision for other possible loss. The loss was occasioned by a
storm, and the court-disregarding what seems to be the clear
intention of the parties as to loss-held that it fell upon the
purchaser.
Since the parties intend a future transfer of ownership Dean
Langdell concluded that that future date was the time to shift
the risk of loss. 39
36

Professor Williston does not think that the

It is surprising that many-large realtor associations make no provision in their standard contracts against such loss. None seems to exist
in Connecticut. New York probably has such a provision, at least in
New York city. The California real estate association's standard form
contains the following clause: "Fourth, That in the event the improvements on said premises should be destroyed or materially damaged between
the date hereof and the consummation or settlement of this purchase this
contract shall at the purchaser's election immediately become null and void
and said, deposit shall be returned to said purchaser on demand." The
National Association has made no recommendation on the matter. Dean
Stone says that "almost universal practice" is to throw the loss on the
vendor, 13 Col. L. Rev. 387.
372 Williston, Contracts, sec. 940.
38(1922) 118 Misc. 329, 193 N.Y.S. 258.
39
"In regard to the performance of the contract, the perfection of
justice consists in its being performed at the time fixed in the contract
for its performance, and therefore the reason is obvious a performance
enforced in equity should relate to that time; but what possible reason
can exist for making such performance relate to the time of making the
contract, i.e. to a time when neither party was bound either to perform or
accept performance."
"What greater injustice could be inflicted than by shifting the consequences of an" act of God from A, upon whom it has fallen, to B upon
whom it did not fall,-who was confessedly in no way responsible for
the act, and who has done no wrong whatever to A, whether by committing a tort or by breaking an obligation."
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date of transfer of title papers necessarily manifests the intention
of the parties as to the passing of the rights and incidents of
ownership. He says:
"If, as frequently happens, a purchaser is given immediate
possession under his contract, with the right to use the property
as his own to the same extent as is customary with a mortgagor,
the title is retained merely as security for payment of the price.
It is a short way of accomplishing the same end as would be
achieved by conveying to the purchaser and taking a mortgage
baek."4o

,It is concluded then that as a rule of law the risk of loss
should shift on such possession being given. Both of these views
are attempts to ascertain and enforce the intention of the parties.
Is it possible to reduce the intention, which the court thus infers
the parties to the contract to have had, to a rule of law ?
Possession is but one of the incidents from which the court
may infer an intention that the ownership shall pass to the purchaser. 4 ' The care of the property, including maintenance, repairs and management; the duty to exercise good husbandry on
the part of the one responsible for the property and to avoid
waste; the obligation to pay taxes; the privilege of keeping the
property insured; the right to the returns from the property are
all incidents of ownership which should have weight with the
court in determining the intention of the parties, and they do not
always, of necessity, follow possession. It might well happen
that by. the contract the purchaser was given immediate possession but that the vendor retained the duty of making repairs, or
the obligation to pay taxes, and of keeping up insurance. What
is the intention of the parties here where incidents of ownership
are divided? The court must decide this problem in each case
rather than apply a rule of law that possession shows the intention of the parties. Let the matter rest frankly in the court's
discretion. This may want in certainty 42 but is not the problem
in its nature incapable of settlement by an inflexible rule?
A supplement to this view has been suggested, (see Clark, Equity
sec. 118) to meet the case where no time for performance has been fixed
by the parties. This view would let the risk of loss shift to the vendee
from the moment the vendor puts the purchaser in default by offering
performance.
402 Williston, Contracts 940; 19 Mich. L. Rev. 831 disagrees. It
is there said, "But it is submitted that if possession by the vendee is a
short way of accomplishing a mortgage, so is a land contract a short way
of getting
rid of the risk of loss on the part of the vendor."
41
The facts in Williams v. Lilley, (1895) 67 Conn. 50, 34 Atl. 765,
37 L.R.A. 150 suggests possibilities.
4220 Mich. L. Rev. 289-313.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
A very respectable line of authority43 applies the same rule to
this problem as obtains at law and which practically all courts
adopt in dealing with contracts for the sale of chattels,4" i.e., the
vendor must bear the risk of loss until legal title is transferred.
45
The leading case for this minority view is Thompson v. Gould.
The court there said:
"When there is an agreement for the sale and purchase of
goods and chattels, and after the agreement, and before the sale
is completed, the property is destroyed by casualty, the loss must
be borne by the vendor, the property remaining vested in him at
the time of its destruction . ..
No reason has been given, nor
can be given, why the same principle should not be applied to
real estate."
After commenting on the equity rule the court declined to
"recognize the legal fiction" on which it was based.
This case was an action at law in which the purchaser was
seeking to recover payments he had made claiming failure of
consideration, the building having been burned, and it could well
be urged that the case, in actual decision, was not contra to the
majority view. This matter, however, has been set at rest in
Massachusetts by the recent case of Libman v. Lozensonj' which
was an equity case and which expressly followed the Thompson
Case.
Certain clear advantages are secured by this view. It is
identical with the rule at law and the rule in practically all juris43
Stent v. Bailis, (1724) 2 P. Wms. 217; Smith v. Ins. Co., (1891)
91 Cal. 323, 13 L.R.A. 475, 25 A.S.R. 191, 27 Pac. 738, (overruling former
cases, at least the dictum in Willis v. Wozencraft, (1863) 22 Cal. 608)
Conlin -i. Osborn, (1911) 161 Cal. 659, 120 Pac. 755 (based on statute);
Higbie v. Shields, (1915) 27 Cal. App. 536, 150 Pac. 801, (where the court
made a great deal of the fact that possession was in the vendor). A note
in 4 Cal. L. Rev. 79 predicted that California was going to accept Prof.
Williston's view. This prediction was not fulfilled. La Chance v. Brown,
(1919) 41 Cal. App. 500, 183 Pac. 216, (here loss was left with the
vendor even though the vendee was given possession). See comments
in 8 Cal. L. Rev. 194. Gould v. Murch, (1879) 70 Me. 288, 35 Am. Rep.
325; Thompson v. Gould, (1838) 20 Pick. 134; Wells v. Calnan, (1871)
107 Mass. 514; Libman v. Levenson, (1920) 236 Mass. 221, 128 N.E.
13, 22 A.L.R. 560, see comments, 19 Mich. L. Rev. 576, 6 Cornell L.Q.
111; Bantz v. Kuhworth, (1869) 1 B. Mon. (Ky.) 133, 25 Am. Rep.
737; Wilson v. Clark, (1880) 60 N.H. 352; Hallett v. Parker, (1896) 68
N.H. 598; Powell v. Ry. Co., (1885) 12 Ore. 488, 8 Pac. 544; Elmore
v. Stevens-Russell Co., (1918) 88 Ore. 509, 171 Pac. 763. Good v. Jarrard,
(1912) 93 S.C. 229, 76 S.E. 698, 43 L.R.A. (N.S.) 383.
44In the case of Potts Drug Co. v. Benedict, (1909) 156 Cal. 322,
104 Pac. 432, 25 L.R.A. (N.S.) 609; which was a case respecting sale of
a chattel interest, the loss was thrown on the vendee because of the
intention of the parties. Osborn v. Nicholson, (1871) 13 Wall. (U.S.)
654, 45
20 L. Ed. 689.
Note 43.
46Note 43.
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dictions in sales of chattels. There is no need of resorting to
legal fictions. Litigation is avoided by letting the loss lie where
it falls. It seems to conform more nearly to common business experience as evidenced by the stipulations in contracts placing loss
on the vendor in almost all instances when the matter is called to
the attention of the parties. Even from the standpoint of property it would seem that more of the material incidents of ownership were with the vendor than with the purchaser. He has the
legal title. He can cut off the purchaser by a sale to a bona fide
purchaser without notice. He usually retains possession and the
right to the returns from the property. He is in a better position to care for the property. The problem of adjusting the insurance money is entirely avoided.
It is submitted that the best disposition of the risk of loss is
to accept the rule of the minority in the cases involving the
simplest group of operative facts. Where there is nothing from
which a court can infer a different intention let the risk of loss
lie with the vendor. Further than this it seems unwise to attempt to formulate a rule. Possession may or may not be a sufficiently controlling element. Since it usually carries other incidents of ownership it would show, in most cases, a reasonably
inferable intention to shift the risk of loss, but it may not in a
given case as above indicated. It is suggested that in those cases
involving additional operative facts each case should be left to
the court to decide as its exigencies require, unhampered by rule,
thus sacrificing certainty to discretion in order to secure equity
and justice in the individual case.

